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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : CaseNo.20040260-CA 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004), driving on a 
suspended or revoked license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53-3-227(3)(a) (West 2004), and driving without registration, a class C misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1303(l) (West 2004), in the Seventh Judicial 
District, Grand County, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding.1 This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
1
 The Utah Legislature has amended all of these statutes since 2000. The changes 
are not relevant to the issues on appeal and do not affect their analysis. Therefore, for 
convenience the State cites to the West 2004 version of the statutes. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the jury instructions adequately convey the concept of "reasonable doubt"? 
Standard of review. "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is 
reviewable under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the 
trial court's ruling." State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, rev'don other 
grounds, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are directly relevant to the issue on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with three counts stemming from an 
August 25, 2000 incident: driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44; driving on a suspended or revoked license, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3)(a); and driving 
without registration, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 4 L-la-
1303(1). Rl-2. Defendant pled guilty to the felony offense, and the trial court imposed 
judgment. R33-42. 
Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea. R44. The trial court denied 
defendant's motion, and defendant appealed. R98-103. This Court reversed, holding that 
the trial court failed to comply strictly with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
when it took defendant's plea. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, ^ 17, 73 P.3d 985. 
2 
Following remand, defendant's case was tried to a jury. The jury returned guilty 
verdicts on all three counts. R150. The trial court imposed a prison term not to exceed 
five years on the DUI conviction. R168-169. The court also imposed six-month and 90-
day terms on the misdemeanor counts, to be served concurrently with the prison term on 
the DUI conviction. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R171. 
After defendant filed his brief of appellant, the State moved this Court to stay 
proceedings pending the Utah Supreme Court's disposition of three cases likely to set 
forth controlling law—State v. Reyes, 20040078-SC; State v. Weaver, 200200735-SC; 
and State v. Cruz, 200300199-SC. The Supreme Court subsequently entered decisions in 
those cases, and this Court reestablished the briefing schedule. See Order dated August 
9, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At about 8:20 a.m. on August 25, 2000, defendant and Dustin Yellow drove into 
the Shirt Tail convenience store in Blanding, Utah. Rl75:60, 90. They picked up a 
twelve-pack of beer and left. Rl 75:60-61. About an hour and a half later, they returned. 
R175:6L Yellow came in to pay for gas. R175:66. Defendant attempted to pull his 
pickup alongside the pumps. Rl75:62. 
Jeff Rogers, the store manager, observed that defendant was having difficulty 
lining his vehicle up with the pumps. Id. He saw the vehicle lurching and heard tires 
screeching. Id. Defendant was "poppin' the clutch and jerkin' it" and "[s]tompin' on the 
brake." Id. Rogers stated, "[T]he whole affair looked a whole lot like tryin' to teach 
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your kids how to drive a stick shift. He was havin' a hard time with it. And he finally 
got up to the dispenser." Id. 
After defendant stepped out of the pickup, Rogers observed that defendant "was 
standin' there and he could not quite hold himself." Rl75:63. After watching 
defendant's behavior, Rogers called the Sheriffs Office. Id.; see also R175:66. He 
reported that he had a drunk driver at the store and asked the Sheriffs Office to get 
"somebody down there and fast, cause [Rogers] didn't want him leavin' before they got 
there." Rl75:66. 
Defendant and Yellow got into an argument beside the pumps. Rl75:67. Both of 
them entered the store, still arguing. Id. Rogers observed that defendant's eyes were 
glazed, that his face had started to sag, and that he was weaving. Rl75:68. When Rogers 
heard defendant threatening Yellow, he again called the Sheriffs Office. Id. 
San Juan County Sheriff Mike Lacy and Blanding police officer Mike Bradford 
responded to Rogers' call. R175:76, 86. Sheriff Lacy took defendant into custody. 
Rl 75:76. Sheriff Lacy could smell the strong odor of alcohol on defendant. Rl 75:77, 
He asked defendant to submit to field sobriety tests. Id. Defendant refused. Id. 
Defendant told Sheriff Lacy that he had drunk a twelve-pack of beer that morning. 
R175-.78. Sheriff Lacy noted that defendant was "[v]ery agitated . . . at [Yellow]." Id. 
He also observed that defendant had slurred speech, spoke with a "thick tongue," and had 
a difficult time maintaining his balance. R175:78-79. 
Sheriff Lacy transported defendant to the jail. R175:79. When the Sheriff took 
defendant out of the patrol car, he had to hold defendant by the elbow to "[m]ake sure 
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that he didn't fall to the ground." Id. Even after his handcuffs were removed, defendant 
moved from side to side as he was walking into the jail. R175:80. At the jail, defendant 
was asked to take a breathalyzer test. Rl75:79. Defendant refused. Id. 
Based on his training and experience, Sheriff Lacy opined that defendant could not 
safely operate the vehicle. Rl75:80-81. 
Defendant stipulated that "you may take it as proven that he was driving a motor 
vehicle on a highway of this state on or about August 25, 2000, while his license to do so 
was denied, disqualified, suspended or revoked, and that the vehicle was not registered as 
required by law." R139 (Jury Instruction 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Recent case law defeats defendant's claim that the trial court erred in giving the 
reasonable doubt instruction. Utah courts have now expressly abandoned any 
requirement that the jury be instructed that the prosecution must "obviate" all reasonable 
doubt. Rather, the jury instructions as a whole must correctly communicate the concept 
of reasonable doubt. 
In this case, the instructions as a whole correctly communicated the concept of 
reasonable doubt. They informed the jury that the State was required to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. They instructed that the jury should acquit if the State failed 
to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions further defined and 
explained the concept of reasonable doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ACCURATELY CONVEYED THE 
CONCEPT OF REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant claims that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was erroneous 
because it informed the jury that "the [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt/' rather than that "the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Br. 
Appellant at 11. Defendant argues that the instruction did not "comport with the three 
part test set forth in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997)." Id. at 10. 
District court proceedings. Defendant requested that the district court give a 
reasonable doubt instruction telling the jury that the State must "obviate all reasonable 
doubt." R156. After discussing the instruction with counsel and after ascertaining that 
most of the jurors did not know the meaning of "obviate," the court declined to give the 
instruction. R175:115120, 133-134, 153-154. 
Instead, the court instructed the jurors that "[t]he [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." R140. The instruction stated: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the 
trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
defendant should be acquitted. 
The [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view 
of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, 
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of 
those bound to act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable 
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doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable pn »pK* w < mid 
entertain based upon the evidence in the case. 
\ in ill I lir luihtTh^h .l.i nl.ml HI "Cil h) ilciiiidanL, i-.. no longer good law. 
Under current law, the instructions, taken as a whole, must sim p I y' c«-111111 \ i n u'; i U 111.11 . i 
defendant cannot be convicted >^,\ crime except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
< :' ^ -• ,%;H*! ^cc^Mi-^ •- .:.. 'me. 
In State v. Reyes, 2004 b i ^ - < < > * * 
held that :* iur\ instruction w;is improper because it stated that "[t]he burden is upon the 
proseuilmn In p n i i I he defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," rather than stating 
that the burden was on tin1 p-
22. In so doing, this Court observed that the Robertson decision could not be reconciled 
Willi IJmted States Supreme Court 's decision in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 TT.S, 1 (1994), 
hnl lirld thai il ilnl nut h-n c (lie iiilliniil1 In mvmik 1 Robertson, Id. at \\ " I t in 
certiorari review, following this Court's lead, the Utah Supreme l \ 'Wi '"i ^ ores ! 
a b a n d o n e d ] " its own precedent, as established in Robertson, and reversed this Court 's 
. 1 . - i s •* * • u , , • » : . *«• , 
Iii two more recent decisions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Re ";) H • s 
In State v. Cruz, 2005 TTT 1^, 5 ^ TTtah Adv. Rep, 30. the Court stated, "[P]ursuant to our 
' •• "• * "*•'" *^" i- - * - e n ^ v adhere instead to the 
F/cfor test for assessing the validity of reasonable . i-
(citations omitted). The Court continued, "Simply put, we need only ask whether the 
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instructions taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt, 
namely, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.5" Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 
In State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, the Supreme Court again 
rejected a defendant's claim that a jury instruction was erroneous because it "omitted the 
term 'obviate.'" Id. at Ifil 2, 8. The Court observed that the jury instructions, "viewed as 
a whole, adequately communicated to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt." Id. at \ 
8. One instruction "informed the jury that the State had the burden of proof and that 'a 
defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. Other instructions further explained the concept of reasonable doubt. Id. 
In the instant case, the instructions were adequate. Jury instruction 5 informed the 
jury that "[t]he [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." R140. That 
instruction mirrors the instruction in Reyes, which informed the jury that "[t]he burden is 
upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 2005 UT 
33, Tf 2. The instruction further stated, "A defendant is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout 
the trial." R140. It also defined "reasonable doubt": "Reasonable doubt is doubt based 
on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.... A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the case." Id. It 
further explained the concept of reasonable doubt: "Reasonable doubt is not a doubt 
based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
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reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of 
those bound to act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt." Id 
In .nldiiinii ||iiiii\ inslnu lion 1 ilic i Iciuciils iir.liuin IIOII, directed, ;i \oubelieve • 
that the [S]tate has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable <J« n ih| \ « i j •  I K I ! I 
•': (! defendant guilty. If the [S]tate has failed to prove any one of those elements beyond 
! -•:••{ ' ,i c ilouhl \OIII slioukl I mil defendant not guilt) K UK 
The instructions in this case arc not ITFOIICOII , ,iin|il> hci „iiise llu \ <li I 
incorporate the "obviate all reasonable doubt" language. The instructions are adequate 
becai ise ""taken as a vv hole,' ' they "correctly communicate the principle oTreasonable 
doubt, namely, that n Hon-i ; .v. • 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with vdiiVli 11« 
is charged, c '>,.. :.o0s TT 45^ |^ 21 (citing/« re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). 
••• . ., ' . •' C n N H J I S I O N 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted in is / ' day of _ lyrtevnwj/. 
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